Three months before the war, the EU decided to transform Gaza's beaches into paragliding spots. Despite previous security concerns, Israel unexpectedly approved the introduction of paraglides into Gaza.
This decision played a critical role in the terrorists' successful infiltration. Using paraglides, they flew over the fence into the Gaza Envelope settlements, disabling the "Shooter Seer" system designed to prevent such attacks.
Despite intelligence agencies typically knowing about minor attacks, Israel's largest terrorist attack went undetected.
Yehuda Meshi Zahav, founder and chairman of ZAKA revealed their coordination with Hamas for every small attack.
Shockingly, reports indicate numerous body refrigerators were installed two weeks before the massacre.
ZAKA (Hebrew: זק"א, abbreviation for Zihuy Korbanot Ason, זיהוי קרבנות אסון, lit. 'Disaster Victim Identification') is a series of voluntary community emergency response teams in Israel.
On the night before the massacre, IDF and Shin Bet heads held an emergency meeting. They concluded that a battle, possibly including civilian kidnappings, was likely on Saturday. Shockingly, they chose not to inform anyone.
Channel 12 News revealed that clear signs of imminent action were discussed, yet no alerts were raised, and no reinforcements were sent. Soldiers were left unaware, resulting in devastating consequences.
On October 7th, field evidence reveals a troubling lack of helicopter intervention during the Hamas attack. Although helicopters were spotted over several communities, they did not engage. In most affected areas, helicopters were absent until the afternoon or even the next morning.
Members of Kibbutz Magen's standby squad reported seeing helicopters flying overhead while they were in prolonged combat with terrorists. Incredibly, the helicopters did not assist. A combat helicopter could have decimated the terrorists from above, but no action was taken. Despite a helicopter base being only a minute and a half away, neither helicopters nor planes arrived.
Army chiefs halted the Air Force, which was on standby and ready to act. An IDF Air Force pilot confirmed on Channel 13 that the Air Force was on routine alert that Saturday but did not intervene. When questioned about why the Air Force did not stop the massacre or deploy Apache helicopters, the pilot responded, "I cannot discuss this topic at this time."
This failure to act raises significant questions about the decisions made by army chiefs and the lack of aerial intervention during the critical hours of the attack.
Multiple testimonies and pieces of evidence indicate that the IDF was ordered to withhold assistance during the Hamas attack, resulting in severe delays and inadequate medical attention for many.
Delayed Response: Citizens and standby units reported IDF response times ranging from 7 to 12 hours, and in some cases even longer. Rabbi Hanania Weissman from the Tzuchar community testified that the IDF first arrived 27 hours after the attack began. Even after initial contact, the army indicated they might not reach the community until the next morning.
Explicit Instructions: Rabbi Hanania Weissman testified that the IDF had explicit orders not to respond for seven hours. A video featuring the chairman of a charity organization, with testimony from Weissman, claims confidential sources informed him the IDF was instructed to stay away from the disaster zone for at least seven hours, allowing Hamas to operate without interference.
Standby Units Left Unsupported: In Beeri, standby unit members saw about 500 well-armed soldiers standing outside while terrorists attacked residents inside. Despite urgent pleas for intervention, the soldiers remained inactive. One survivor even communicated directly with the Prime Minister, who assured him the situation was being addressed, yet no action was taken for hours.
Premeditated Withdrawals: Channel 13 reported that soldiers from the Golani Brigade, patrolling the fence line, were ordered to leave the area half an hour before the Hamas attack. They were directed to evacuate the exact route through which Hamas later infiltrated. Had the Golani fighters remained, they could have intercepted the terrorists.
This account of delayed military response, explicit orders to withhold assistance, and unexplained withdrawals suggests a troubling narrative of the events surrounding the attack, raising serious questions about potential premeditation and coordination.
In an interview with Channel 13, the military regular security coordinator of the Shlomit community recounted his experience on the day of the Hamas attack. When he contacted the IDF for assistance, he received a text message with a sad emoji in response.
Despite numerous breaches in the fence, not a single point was shelled or blocked. Terrorists launched a second wave of attacks, taking more prisoners and killing more civilians, yet no military aid arrived. It appeared as if someone had instructed the IDF to withhold intervention until the late afternoon.
In a recent article by Walla News, a senior reserve officer revealed a troubling incident related to the investigation of the October 7 attack. The officer recounted sitting with a general to review a video of one of the events, only to discover that the videos had been deleted.
"It was very embarrassing," the officer said. "Then suspicion arose, and finally, the excuses started. We were told that special privileges had been granted to those who requested. But rank officers like us need permissions? It seems like a war of generals and military roles. It feels like everyone is now trying to take care of themselves after the attack."
This revelation raises serious concerns about transparency and accountability within the military, suggesting a possible cover-up and internal conflict following the attack.
In a recent article by Walla News, a senior reserve officer revealed a troubling incident related to the investigation of the October 7 attack. The officer recounted sitting with a general to review a video of one of the events, only to discover that the videos had been deleted.
"It was very embarrassing," the officer said. "Then suspicion arose, and finally, the excuses started. We were told that special privileges had been granted to those who requested. But rank officers like us need permissions? It seems like a war of generals and military roles. It feels like everyone is now trying to take care of themselves after the attack."
This revelation raises serious concerns about transparency and accountability within the military, suggesting a possible cover-up and internal conflict following the attack.
Survivors' testimonies from that fateful Saturday paint a disturbing picture: the terrorists were remarkably calm and unhurried. Unlike the typical behavior of skilled Hamas operatives, who are trained to act swiftly due to the expected rapid response of the IDF, these terrorists lingered. They entered homes, cooked food, and sat down to eat on the lawns, showing no fear of immediate retaliation.
The terrorists' leisurely behavior suggests they were confident they had ample time to carry out their brutal activities. They knew they had a significant time window to organize, kill, loot, and rob without facing immediate intervention. This raises troubling questions: who leaked this information to them? How were they able to execute their plan until the evening without any hindrance?
Retired police superintendent Avi Weiss revealed troubling details about the failure of the "See Shoot" system, designed to safeguard Israeli borders. This sophisticated defense mechanism, capable of remote activation, is intended to deter and incapacitate intruders attempting to breach the fence. However, on the day of the attack, the system was inexplicably offline.
Superintendent Weiss clarified that the system was not malfunctioning but deliberately deactivated under orders from higher-ranking officials. This deliberate neutralization rendered the entire defense system inoperative, enabling Hamas terrorists to infiltrate Israeli territory unimpeded. With the "See Shoot" system offline, Hamas operatives exploited drones to breach the fence and disable border cameras, further compromising security.
In the weeks leading up to the tragic massacre, the IDF made the perplexing decision to deactivate the towering observation balloons stationed along the Gaza border, crucial for monitoring the region's security. Despite looming warnings of an impending conflict, the IDF deferred maintenance on these critical surveillance assets, opting to resume regular operations.
Media investigations uncovered that the observation balloons, requiring mere one-day renovations, were inexplicably excluded from service upon receiving an order from the IDF. Strikingly, their deactivation coincided precisely with the terrorist attack by Hamas. The IDF had the capability to swiftly repair and restore these vital assets, yet deliberately postponed their maintenance until after the devastating events of Shabbat Simchat Torah, disregarding urgent warnings.
Eyewitness accounts further corroborate the negligence surrounding the observation balloons. Residents from communities such as Netiv Haa'Sara observed these balloons grounded on the eve of the attack, contrary to their usual 24-hour surveillance protocol. Despite heightened Hamas activity along the border, the IDF dismissed residents' concerns, insisting on the withdrawal of troops from the area, a decision met with incredulity and frustration among local communities.
Retired police superintendent Avi Weiss has exposed a shocking failure in the "Omega" intelligence system. This crucial system, designed to provide vital intelligence, was completely offline during the incident, leading to a severe lack of coordination between military units and commanders.
This breakdown created a dangerous disconnect from the reality on the ground, raising serious questions about the preparedness and response capabilities during the crisis.
Retired police superintendent Avi Weiss sheds light on the Shin Bet's intelligence shortcomings. Their sophisticated system designed to monitor Arab social networks failed during a critical period.
Despite an alert about Hamas' mobilization—indicated by the activation of thousands of Hamas SIM cards in Gaza at 1 a.m.—decisive action was delayed and ultimately dismissed the next day. This failure to respond, despite clear conflict indicators, highlights systemic intelligence deficiencies.
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